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Abstract  
Using Margaret Archer’s constructs, namely structure, culture, and agency, this paper argues 
that although there are commendable structural changes in the CHE (Council on Higher 
Education) and RPL (Recognition of Prior Learning) policy which accommodate marginalised 
and unstructured experiential knowledge, thus equating it with ‘scientific’ knowledge produced 
by the university, there remains subtle preservations of material interests of the corporate agent 
(CHE policy maker) and the ideas, beliefs, and theories the latter holds about the place of 
unstructured learning and knowledge in universities. To advance this argument, a critique is 
mounted on three accommodative sub-units of the CHE RPL policy, namely: the notion of 
exemption, residency clause, and the ten percent ceiling on the number of applicants admitted 
through RPL. The rare allowance for exceptional deviations to the two latter notions (by CHE) is 
infused in the foregoing critique. In the final analysis, a reconsideration of these provisions is 
suggested.  
 
Keywords: Council on Higher Education, corporate agent, Recognition of Prior Learning, 
social actors 
 
 
Introduction 
The origins of RPL (Recognition of Prior Learning) in South Africa are political. It was driven by 
labour movements (Ralph, 2016). They reflected political and moral concerns, over and above 
economic needs and human capital development (Cooper, et al., 2016; Ralph, 2016). There 
was a need to redress the past imbalances to those who were closed out of the doors of 
education, and to ensure access to those who do meet the formal requirements for entry into 
school (De Graaff, 2014).  RPL would then become critical to the development of an equitable 
and just higher education system that facilitates access to mobility and progression within the 
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higher education qualifications sub-framework (Baijnath, 2016), especially for those who are 
historically marginalised and excluded from access to education (Cooper, et al., 2016).  
Effectively, it would be radical and paradigmatic. ‘Radical RPL’ (Harris, 1999: 133), or a 
‘critical paradigm’ (Luckett, 1999: 72) is a liberatory conception that is ‘politically interested and 
socially constructed’, in that it questions the notion of organisation of knowledge phenomena 
into ‘objective’ and objectivising formalistic structures by presenting other forms and modes of 
knowledge which are informal, unstructured, and/or uncodified as equally legitimate and worthy 
of equal recognition. In a sense, it disrupts the powerful rules of knowledge production and 
distribution, the historically powerful mainstream ‘scientific’ discourses (Cooper, et al., 2016). 
The (hesitant) acceptance of this disruption and intrusion is clear in the CHE (Council on 
Higher Education) RPL policy. The latter provides for the ‘“inclusion” [of informally acquired 
learning] to overcome a variety of barriers to access and success in higher education’ and 
speaks of RPL as a specialised pedagogical device which makes ‘possible [the] contribution of 
informal and/or non-formal knowledge’ (CHE, 2016: 7).  
To this end, CHE warns against the use of mainstream assessment methods because 
prior learning may not always be expressed in languages that are inherent in the pedagogies of 
a particular institution (ibid.). This is consistent with the view by Cooper et al. (2016: 124) which 
sees RPL practices as a specialised pedagogy and a fund of tools to ‘navigate learning and 
assessment practices’ between and within different contexts of learning. It necessarily involves 
the ‘translation of informal and non-formal bodies of knowledge into the formal and structured 
equivalents based on specified competencies’ (CHE, 2016: 27). 
To make RPL possible, institutional policies are to clearly state how RPL will be applied to 
gain entry to or achieve the qualification in higher education (SAQA, 2013), and how it would be 
applied to achieving qualifications or part qualifications (Bolton and Samuels, 2016). These 
should speak to RPL as a possible alternative access (SAQA, 2013) in order to make the 
previously disenfranchised participate in the education and training system (Bolton, et al., n.d.). 
However, the notion of how this accommodative alternative access, RPL, is understood, 
fashioned, and actioned derives from and is especially framed by the CHE which functions 
under the national policies (such as SAQA, South African Qualifications Authority) related to 
RPL.  
These policies themselves draw from and reflect particular discourses in the domain of 
ideas about what constitutes knowledge and the implication on how the latter is to be 
recognised as valid. In these discourses, even after consensus – unanimous or not – the 
challenge is always about how to recognise, compare, validate, and certify knowledge that is 
pre-structured by and in a university with knowledge that has occurred outside university 
(Ralphs, 2016). The answer to this requires reference to how enabling and/or constraining are 
the elements of the CHE RPL policy provisions, and how they reflect the broader ideas or 
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theories the policy makers (corporate agent) hold about knowledge and the extent of its 
boundedness.  
Using Archer’s (1995; 1996; 2000) constructs of structure, culture, and agency, this paper 
critically contends that though CHE RPL policy makes accommodative provisions and some 
structural changes have occurred in regards recognition of knowledge from outside university, 
there are instances of convergences of material interests and ideas of policy makers (corporate 
agent) in the manner these policy provisions are conceived. These convergences reflect the 
subtle, unpronounced, inferiority of prior and unstructured learning and knowledge. Three CHE 
RPL provisions are used as sub-units against which the critique is mounted. These are: the 
notion of exemption, the residency clause, and the ten percent ceiling on a number of RPL 
applicants which can be admitted. The critique of the concept of ‘exception to the rule’ as 
provided in the policy is infused in the critique of the latter two units.    
It is worth noting that this paper does not necessarily defend any of the two broad 
discourses on RPL per se, the constructivist or the social realist account of knowledge. Instead, 
the critique of CHE provisions on RPL reveal the broad differences in these discourses on the 
nature of knowledge and its extent of boundedness in order to conclude that those at the sector 
policy level (corporate agent) draw on these discourses, in agreement or disagreement with 
them, when making policy, and as such the discourses have a bearing on what comes out as 
policy provisions of CHE, in as much as social actors (university officials) cannot avoid making 
inferences of the same nature when making their RPL-ing decisions in institutional contexts.  
 
Archer’s constructs: structure, culture, and agency 
The critical analysis of CHE RPL provisions constituting the three sub-units is predicated on 
Archer’s (1995; 1996; 2000) constructs of structure, culture, and agency.  
Archer is a social realist who is influenced by Bhaskar (1975), a critical realist who argues 
for different layers of reality, namely the realm of real, actual, and experience. At an ontological 
level, Archers argues for a stratified nature of social reality (Collier, 1994). There are ‘parts’ and 
‘people’ (Archer, 1995, 1996, 2000). Parts are divided into social structures and cultural 
systems. Structure refers to relations of material interests, while a cultural system refers to 
ideas, beliefs, and theories which exist at a particular time in any social institution’s propositional 
register. People refer to reflective and reflexive individuals/agents who have divergent interests 
to either reproduce or transform such structures and cultural systems which they are embroiled 
in.  
So that, ontologically speaking, structure is independent from or predates, and conditions, 
people’s actions, as much as it is irreducible to ideas, beliefs, and theories (culture) in the 
propositional register. Yet, people are also independent from both structure and culture because 
they can take any number of courses of actions in the face of structural constraints and can 
influence each other at the socio-cultural level, which in turn add to the propositional register.   
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Theoretically, actions are not determined, but conditioned, by structures (Archer, 2000). 
By this ontological premise of stratified reality, she does not propose philosophical dualism 
(Newman, 2017). Instead, she believes in the temporal separation of ‘parts’ from ‘people’, 
including structure from culture (Archer, 1995). She does this separation for purpose of analysis 
of each stratum’s irreducible and causally efficacious emergent powers in order to explore how 
each stratum acts back on others and vice versa in the interplay to produce a particular social 
outcome that is reproductive or transformative of structure, culture, and agency.     
 
Structure-agency relation  
Regarding structure, she says there are three levels of analysis one can engage during an 
investigation, namely institutional, positions, or roles. Positions tell us where agents are situated 
in the social system in terms of power and distribution of resources, whether financial, 
intellectual, or otherwise. Some are privileged whilst others are disenfranchised (Archer, 1995). 
Tied to positions is the notion of bargaining power deriving from the extent of access to 
resources in relation to an interest group (corporate agent). SAQA, for example, has the power 
(backed by the political government department of higher education) to set the framework on 
issues of RPL and other higher education policies in order to advance an integrated and well-
articulated system of education and training in South Africa.  
On the other hand, the CHE RPL policy makers have the power of making sector policies. 
The universities enjoy the independence of making institutional policies within the sector and 
national framework. More, university academic actors, such as Heads of Departments, Deans, 
and RPL coordinators, are located differently in the distribution of power and resources in that 
they are executors of these policies but may – certainly few of them – or may not be involved at 
the policy making level of the sector. Lecturers are located at the lower level of the ladder but 
have the power to take certain academic decisions on articulation through RPL. But their 
decisions get a ratification or rejection at a collective faculty and senate level.  
Thus, the distribution of resources (structure) in which agency navigates is critical. The 
people who draft policies at CHE also belong to the higher education institutions and have 
vested interest to maintain or control the outcome of interaction on issues of higher education in 
their favor. So that, policy statements and principles in CHE (2016) documents reflect their own 
vested interests, vested in the positions they occupy as the corporate agent.  
Yet, vested interests of this group affect the primary agents: they affect the students 
(applying for RPL) who cannot articulate their interests or have only aggregate effect on the 
structure owing to the fact that they are disorganised and not so active in structural modelling 
(Archer, 2000). Furthermore, the number that can be admitted through RPL, including the 
exemptions which can or may be granted, spells out these dynamic interests of the group, 
whatever may be advanced as reasons for the latter.  
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Apart from exercising their agency in a group, when social actors go back to their roles in 
institutional contexts, they may exploit ambiguities appearing in the policy prescripts or its 
flexibilities in ways which serve their interests. Yet, these roles in which they act in unpredictable 
ways and the expectations therein predate them and therefore condition the actions they may 
wish to engage in as actors (Archer, 1995). But as actors with certain ideas and beliefs, they 
may draw from the discourses on the nature, form, and conception of knowledge and the 
classifications of the latter to justify their decision-making processes. In this context, their 
agency comes out, either in opposition to, or in concordance with, the policy provisions which 
they were part of their making.  
 
Culture 
Archer, analytically and temporarily, separates and distinguishes a Cultural System (CS) from 
Socio-Cultural interaction (S-C). CS pertains to ideas, theories, and beliefs at the level of the 
systems, whether known or unknown to agents (Archer, 1995; Porpora, 2011).  Thus, it pertains 
to logical relations which may either have low or high degree of integration or contradictions in 
the CS (Archer, 1995). Yet, it is the making of agents.  S-C pertains to influences of people on 
one another at the level of interaction (ibid.).  
At this level, there is a dialogue, group formations, organisation, articulation, and pursuit of 
various vested interests; however, these may be of little or to great effect, depending on the 
extent of power and exchange at this level, and the distribution of resources such as power, 
sanctions, expertise. Here Archer talks of ways in which causal consensus is produced, namely 
through ‘manipulation, mystification, legitimation, persuasion and argumentation’ (Archer, 1995: 
179). For her, causal consensus at the S-C level ‘tends to be intimately allied to the use of 
power and influence, whereas logical consistency [at CS] is entirely independent of them since it 
exists whether or not it is socially exploited or concealed, and regardless of it even being 
recognised (ibid.: 179). S-C requires agential instigation. Yet, CS and S-C mutually influence 
one another and overlap. 
 
A constraining contradiction  
Archer speaks of a constraining contradiction as one of the four situational logics at a CS level. 
Constraining contradiction is the site of cultural tension. It is that ‘part of the system in which A 
and B are located, and is characterised by a form of ‘strain’ which arises from their 
incompatibility in the context of an internal and necessary relationship’ (Archer, 1995: 230). 
There are two logically inconsistent ideas/beliefs/theories, say A and B. The discourses show 
these to be the notion of situated socially constructed knowledge versus social realist view 
which holds knowledge to be different.  
Recognition of prior learning: A critique of CHE policy provisions 39 
	
Here two ideas, beliefs, and theories – as embedded in the sector policy made by the 
corporate agent – are embroiled in an internal and necessary relationship of dependence, and 
one cannot extricate from the other (A is in contradiction with B). The way out is one of three 
methods of correcting the contradiction, namely: first, either the reinterpretation of B by A to 
make the B consistent with A.  
It follows that because A wants to retain itself, B is at stake since the object of its 
interpretation is to ‘tame it through reinterpretation’ (Archer, 1996: 233). At the same time the 
point is to accommodate the contradiction not as is, but as now reinterpreted.  
The result is what she calls ‘ideational syncretism’ in terms of which differences are sunk, 
not eliminated (ibid.). The second is the reinterpretation of both, in which case each of them 
sheds some of their earlier elements. What happens during correction here is ‘concept 
stretching’. If this method does not work, the final one is the reinterpretation of A by B, implying 
that A has now to do the adjusting in order to avoid its total extinction in light of B.  
In terms of this paper, somewhat consistent with method two above, RPL – as a radical 
and paradigmatic pedagogic device – certainly forced the higher education sector to call for the 
creative construction of tools of assessment which are out of the ordinary in comparison to the 
traditional ones. Thus, it was forced to elasticate its concept of assessment, together with its 
procedures in order to accommodate informal knowledge and learning. As such, it also had to 
shed the sole claim to knowledge production and distribution of its benefits, as much as prior 
learning had to subject itself to a rigorous process which seeks to scientificise it. Though repair 
of the contradiction between A and B leads to some form of syncretism or ideational unification 
(Archer, 1996), the latter does not mean proportional or absolute consensus at the S-C level. 
This is precisely because policy itself is a contestable document even by its drafters. It is a 
product of negotiation, argument, and compromise.  
Nevertheless, ‘everything depends on whether syncretism happens to coincide with a 
prolonged lack of antagonism in society or whether it meshes with structured cleavages 
between social groups’ (Archer, 1996: 234). Yet, successful syncretism may save the ‘social 
structure from pronounced ideational division and diversity’ (Archer, 1995: 316). The latter 
already demonstrates the critical analysis in the next section in that the ideational division is not 
so pronounced, but it is subtle and requires much labour to bring to the fore.  
 
Agency  
Agency refers to the reflexive, creative, innovative, and purposeful actions of people as social 
actors or organised groups (Archer 1995; 1996). In general terms, agency does two key things: 
first, it mediates between the human and actor by supplying activity with a purpose; and, 
through mediation, it accounts for who acquires which role within the role array (Archer, 1995). It 
also tells us ‘why they [actors] do what they do when the role does not require them to do it’ 
(Archer, 2000: 257). The answer to this lies in the fact that though constrained by roles and 
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institutional expectations, they are not robotic executors of those roles. They are actors who 
have interests and concerns which they pursue and want achieved. They actively mobilise and 
organise for shared interests, i.e. they become a corporate agent. 
A Corporate agent is defined by its power to define and re-define structural forms and is 
fundamental to whether systemic fault-lines are split open or maintained. ‘Its typical powers are 
capacities for articulating shared interests, organising for collective action, generating social 
movements and exercising corporate influence in decision-making’ (Archer, 2000: 266). Archer 
locates vested interest groups in the hierarchy of resource distributions (Archer, 1995: 300). The 
one resource in hand is expertise of the corporate agents, expertise in a subjective manner 
since these can be contestable, especially given the discourse on knowledge in hand.  
The question of distribution of intellectual resources and power has significant 
implications, namely, ‘the greater the concentration of resources, the fewer the number of 
parties who will be able strategically to transact societal change’ (ibid.: 298). Effectively a 
corporate agent acts in pursuit of its interests.  
However, Archer does not see members of the same group as neatly homogeneous in 
relation to the question in hand. They may have similar or different end goals. Within a group of 
corporate agents, she asks: ‘how far do corporate agents get on with one another and pull 
together to attain joint or mutually compatible goals?’ (Archer, 1995: 301) This question is 
critical in terms of particular interactive processes engaged in by the agents in each particular 
case. The case in point does not make that assumption of homogenous goals precisely 
because of the positioning of the agents, and because of the fact that they do not come from the 
same university.  
This being the case, and members of the powerful group being actors in their own right in 
certain institutions, it follows that decisions taken at that level are a result of negotiation of 
argument, compromises, and eventual broad – though not absolute – consensus. In this regard, 
this paper relies on the analysis of policy documents, not interaction with policy makers and 
actors per se. So that, the argument is abstracted only at the level of structural and cultural 
properties of the CHE policy and how these impinge on actors in institutional contexts.  
Corporate agency – ‘the structural and cultural elites’ (Archer, 2000: 273) ‘who play the 
major part in institutional decision-making’ (Archer, 2000: 189) – thus shapes the context for all 
actors (usually not in the way any particular agent wants but as the emergent consequence of 
corporate interaction) (Archer, 1995: 261). In some instances, structure and culture can so 
correspond as to mutually reinforce reproduction against transformation. As Archer puts it: ‘[t]he 
reciprocal influence between the structural and cultural domains reinforces the status quo and, 
in the process, perpetuates the preliminary divide between Corporate and Primary Agents by 
precluding re-grouping’ (1995: 261).  As things seem, at the level of the systemic influences, 
some elaboration of structure has happened with regards to RPL and the extent of 
accommodation thereof as an assessment tool and a specialised pedagogy.  
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This progress has, however, only gone so far and not yet further in that there are certain 
ceilings on how many RPL candidates can be admitted, how to conceptually treat RPL in 
respect the notion of credit and exemption, and the number of credits on which an exemption 
can happen. What is retained by these sector provisions at the cultural level is that the 
university is the one that does the validation of learning from outside. By this, it is shown shortly 
that culture has reproduced its ideas of power and control of knowledge, though some structural 
properties have been elaborated. Thus, the policy aspects which enable RPL do not at the 
same time help eliminate the ideas and beliefs about marginalised knowledge coming in the 
form of RPL. So that, corporate agent ideas remain hegemonic and are reproduced at the level 
of primary agents, and to some extent institutional actors; thus, maintaining cultural unification 
(Archer, 1996; 2000).   
As stated above, the way institutional actors act is not predetermined, no matter how 
stringent the constraints, nor do enablements predetermine that people will exploit these 
enablements, for RPL may not be in concert with their own interests. Nor is it a matter of fact 
that they will act in their material interest at all material times, for they can sacrifice those 
interests – provided they value certain values more than their immediate interests. The nuanced 
argument inserted here is that actors are not absolutely powerless; it is that they stand in a 
relation of at least less powerfulness in comparison to the corporate agent, and their degree of 
negotiation and transacting at the level of action and decision can only tend to conform to policy.  
However, their own view on politics of knowledge boundaries and how to cross the latter 
through RPL cannot be divorced from the provisions of the CHE policy as conditioning and 
enabling structural properties and powers. This is even more so if one takes into account the 
discourses that they (corporate agent and actors) draw from and the implications thereof. The 
outcome at the level of institutional practice can only be as dynamic and complex as the 
discourses.  
 
The discourse on knowledge boundaries: i ts relation to RPL  
The one broad theory which seems to enjoy acceptance is that knowledge is stratified and 
differentiated (Cooper, 2016; Harris, 2014). This view is premised on the notion that ‘the way 
knowledge is acquired does matter and cannot be assumed to be unimportant in the 
assessment and certification of this knowledge’ (Cooper, 2016: 26). The university-produced 
knowledge prides itself on being scientific, and thus rigorous and credible. It claims to be 
unshackled by the peculiar nature and context-boundedness of everyday knowledge concepts, 
in the process seeing itself as possessing great explanatory potential because it is specialised 
or scientific knowledge and its concepts are capable of cross-cutting various contexts (Young, 
2008).  
It is opposed to the notion that knowledge is knowledge and, therefore, equal in value, 
regardless of where it is acquired. Michelson’s (1996) critique of knowledge difference is vital. 
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The author says that knowledge difference takes a westernised Cartesian view of mind and 
body. This worldview sees a strict dichotomy between different knowledges. The author instead 
advances the view of knowledge as socially situated in sites of production (ibid.).  
The issue of importance, given these two broad views on knowledge, is how structured 
and unstructured knowledge is brought together and put on an equal footing. Cooper (2016: 26), 
though taking the view of knowledge as differentiated, admits that knowledge is contested, to 
the point where there are ‘unequal power relations that lead to the privileging some sources of 
epistemological authority over others’. RPL is forced to operate in this contested boundary 
space. Under these circumstances, it may be validated that equating experiential learning with 
codified knowledge is not easy (Cooper, 2016). As a consequence, ‘any process of RPL would 
require the RPL candidate to embark on a process of navigating the boundaries between 
different knowledge discourses, and hence the need for a specialist pedagogic role in mediating 
the complexities of knowledge recognition across different learning pathways’ (Cooper, 2016: 
24). The tension between knowledge discourses and power relations between structured and 
unstructured knowledge is further reflected when academics as actors in institutional contexts 
experience what Osman (2003: 159) calls ‘knowledge paradox’ with regard to codified and 
experiential knowledge:  
	
If they value experiential knowledge only, they marginalise the students in a university 
environment where academic knowledge is powerful. If on the other hand they render 
experiential knowledge invisible then they are contributing to the dominance of academic 
knowledge in the academy.  
 
Michelson (1996; 2006) associates the paradox with the politics of knowledge, especially 
the rationalist epistemology that is skewed towards higher education. Implicit in the 
representation of the paradox is the dominance of the academy over those modes of knowing 
which are outside it on the one hand, and the pre-dispositional potential tendency of the 
actor/academic to subscribe to the institutional mode of thought where politics of knowledge 
production and distribution are concerned. Thus, it is without dispute that the codified or 
structured knowledge produced by the university already enjoys the power in the interactive 
negotiation and exchange by these discourses.  
This power is expressed in, and derives from, various linguistic conceptions in the 
literature advocating for, and justifying the importance of, RPL, such as ‘accommodation’ and 
‘inclusion’ of the historically ‘marginalised’ modes of knowledge. In this connection, Michelson 
(1996; 2006) is right in concluding that alternative forms and sources of epistemological 
authority outside structured forms remain marginalised. Evidently, if knowledge is contested 
(even contestable), then the contestants are interest groups (corporate agent) with vested 
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interests, owing to material and/or ideational interests which either side wishes to preserve or 
transform (ibid.).   
Michelson (1996) sees RPL as a mechanism to accommodate such contested knowledge. 
During such recognition, RPL – for it to be inclusive – must recognise and consider the nature of 
the structure of a discipline or academic field concerned and relations between formal and 
informal knowledge within that discipline or field (Breier, 2003; 2006). It is precisely this notion of 
accommodation which demonstrates that power and control – in terms of how and by who prior 
learning is to be integrated, formalised, assessed, and ultimately given value – actually lie in the 
academy. The analysis of the policy provisions should necessarily reveal both the power and 
the structural and cultural form they take.  
Similarly, the corporate agent at the CHE RPL policy making level must have been driven 
by the material interests they seek to promote or preserve and the ideas they hold and the 
discourses which support those ideas about academic and experiential knowledge. In a sense, 
what precedes the sector policies on RPL are theories which frame them.  
This goes to show that policy provisions cannot be insulated from interestedness of the 
corporate agent who made them, nor can their successful production produce uniform 
responses from institutional actors, some of whom are involved in the policy formulation 
processes – as the case may be. 
The latter being the case, we contend that the sector policy on RPL contains prejudicial 
and subtle conceptions in the form of the following accommodative policy provisions, namely: 
the notion of exemption, fifty percent ceiling, exceptions, and the ten percent ceiling on the 
number RPL applicants to be admitted to a university. These prohibitive provisions, it is argued 
below, reflect the convergence of material benefits and ideational power of the structured 
institutions of learning as against unstructured learning.  
 
A crit ique of the accommodative notions   
There are at least four problematic notions suggested in the sector policy which merit critical 
analysis through the constructs of Archer, namely structure, culture, and agency. These are: the 
notion of exemption, the residency clause, the notion of exceptions, and the ten percent ceiling 
on the number of RPL applicants that should gain admission.  
 
The notion of “exemption” 
The sector policy conceived the notion of ‘exemption’ of an applicant if prior learning is 
demonstrated (CHE, 2016) as an accommodative provision for RPL processes. The academic 
transcript of the RPL-ed applicant would, as per this conception, show that one has been 
exempted from the modules (CHE, 2016). Of critical importance here is that this accommodative 
provision does not conceptually tally with the national policy.  
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The latter talks of ‘credit’ being awarded on the basis ‘knowledge and skills acquired 
through experience and not for experience alone’ (SAQA, 2013: 6). Showing that one is 
exempted from modules achieves one side of the equation; namely, it removes the structural 
barrier and ensures inclusiveness and provision of alternative for the applicant.  
However, it does not get rid of the idea of how the certificate was gathered, and the beliefs 
of others who hold that valid and credible knowledge is acquired at the university. At any rate, 
the notion of exemption violates one of the responsibilities of the Quality Councils, according to 
which the latter should ‘ensure that no distinction, other than for data analysis, is made between 
qualifications awarded through conventional and RPL routes’ (SAQA, 2013: 10). This violation, it 
is argued, may not necessarily be mistaken. It may be an attempt to insulate its own produced 
knowledge from that produced from ‘outside’. By this conceptual maneuver, its status as a 
university is preserved, and as such there is a prolongation of its ideations as the center of 
power in knowledge production and distribution.  
The above shows that structural elaboration seems to take place so far as the structural 
barrier to access and inclusivity of other forms of learning has been removed. However, at the 
level of culture, there is morphostasis. This is consistent with Archer’s (1995) view that structure 
may be elaborated without culture necessarily following suit, or vice versa. To understand this 
argument further, Archer (1995) maintains that certain ideas endure for long, and do not 
necessarily change radically and suddenly, especially if their reproduction serves those in power 
insofar as discourse and material resources are concerned. It is true that RPL proponents 
represent a new corporate agent whose accommodation is a result of contestation in the arena 
of politics of knowledge. So that, Archer (1995: 265) would say that RPL-ing processes by 
universities result from ‘alliance formation [with structured higher education], goal dilution, and 
ideological accommodation from the interest groups who constitute it, precisely in order to 
become an effective force’.   
In other words, the notion of ‘exemption’ as a symbol of accommodation of elements of 
RPL in the politics of knowledge at least implies on one hand the parity of competencies 
acquired through prior learning (SAQA, 2018), while the sector and conservative institutions 
retain some epistemological indictment on prior learning through this conception. It gives 
(hesitantly) the recognition, not credit per se, whilst it preserves its superiority. After all, it is itself 
that is doing the accommodating, and RPL which is getting the accommodation from it. It is RPL 
therefore that has been reinterpreted in a way that appears to stick with the structured notions. 
What the university had to shed is not so much its power, but that it had to stretch its 
assessment processes into a medium commensurate with RPL. In the final analysis, the 
stereotypical view with which history has looked at learning occurring ‘outside’ the jurisdiction of 
universities is preserved by this conception, certainly at the level of ideas and beliefs about 
learning.  
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Fifty percent: the predetermined ceil ing 
The structural property (exclusion of prior learning) which denied the crossing of boundaries and 
navigation is somewhat gone. However, the sector policy has another powerful structural 
mechanism which in the final analysis could have a prohibitive effect on the one hand, whilst 
reinforcing the ideas and theories held about knowledge on the other hand. It says that a 
qualification cannot be awarded in full on the basis of RPL (CHE, 2016). This prohibition, it must 
be contended, is suffixed and couched with the view that this could done without precluding a 
possible exemption (SAQA, 2018).  
Yet, the rule goes on to say that exemption by means of RPL should be limited to no more 
than fifty percent of the modules or courses of the qualification in question. Precisely speaking, 
the sector policy says that ‘full qualifications are not awarded solely on the basis of RPL’ (CHE, 
2016: 8).  
This residency clause is viewed by Blom (2013) and Needham (2012) as a generally 
outdated rule that needs revision.  
This ceiling, at any rate, is subtly, if not directly, inconsistent with SAQA’s policy on RPL 
which maintains that ‘qualifications and part-qualifications registered on the NQF may be 
awarded in whole or in part through RPL’ (SAQA, 2018: 94). Nor is it consistent with what other 
renowned scholars say about knowledge which should inform sector policy. In a study by 
Cooper and others, it was found that, amongst other things, ‘knowledge and knowledge 
structures do not impact in a deterministic way on the feasibility of RPL in relation to a particular 
programme’ (Cooper, et al., 2016: 39). Interestingly, these are authors who subscribe to the 
notion of knowledge difference and boundedness of knowledge into disciplinary contexts. 
The preceding resonates with other findings. For example, one empirical example shows 
that institutions (corporations, for example) outside a university can have codified knowledge as 
a particular context with bounded knowledge (De Graaff, 2014). This knowledge might or might 
not be transferrable to another context (ibid.). The key here is might. This implies that 
transferability cannot be known a priori, nor should, as a consequence, RPL officers be guided 
in advance by a ceiling of fifty percent. After all, the sector policy, though it has the ceiling, does 
admit that articulation should be determined by the nature, purpose, form, and content of a 
curriculum (CHE, 2016).  
If the a priori blocking (of transfer of credit) is done, as the case is now, it basically places 
a structural constraint concordant with the idea and belief about knowledge what and how. The 
subtle dynamic here lies in the fact that the ceiling (of fifty percent) already places a pre-
suppositional prohibition, though it claims to offer an exception. In the end, the prohibition 
enables those actors interested in the preservation of the status quo to defend their decisions 
and actions, including feeling validated in their ideas in the contested space of knowledge.  
The notion of ‘exception’, on the other hand, allows those wishing to advocate and engage 
in boundary-crossing practices to do so. Yet, the latter gets embroiled into a complex interplay, 
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because his/her decision are still subjected to decisions of an institutional corporate agent 
whose interests are as diverse, but who operate on the basis of that pre-determined ceiling by 
the sector policy. Evidence appears to show in a recent study that despite SAQA allowing 
awarding full qualifications, institutions often rely on the fifty percent rule (Bolton et al., n.d.); this 
is based on the existing regulation that a candidate must obtain fifty percent at the institution 
that will be awarding a certificate for the qualification (CHE, 2016). This justification considers 
funding and certification related issues, not articulation.  
Effectively there is a corporate agent with a vested interest in the preservation of funding 
(structure) which happens to converge with the cultural systemic property (knowledge what and 
knowledge how) at the level of discourse about RPL. The outcome under these interplaying 
constructs is more complex, depending on the beliefs and theories of role players in institutional 
contexts. The study by Cooper et al. (2016), for example, shows mixed empirical results on RPL 
practices of institutional actors, with some holding a stronger view on dichotomy of knowledge, 
while others do not.  
In this connection, it may be argued that ‘a person occupying a particular role [RPL 
practitioner or academic] acquires vested interests within it and is both constrained and enabled 
by its 'dos and don’ts' in conjunction with the penalties and promotions which encourage 
compliance’ (Archer, 1995: 187).  
Yet, these are not determinants – as the empirical study above shows mixed results – 
because there is leeway for interpretation deriving from the ambiguity of policy provisions, 
especially given that they are also only partial in their coverage and clarity. The leeway in this 
case is the notion of “exception” to the fifty percent rule. Whilst there is openness in the vague 
concept “exception”, the actors who may also be part of the corporate agent responsible for the 
policy on RPL may be of such nature that they exploit these depending on whether they will not 
lose – or are in any case willing to pay the price of acting out of sync with normative 
expectations – their prior position in the distribution of resources. Those in the prior distribution 
who hold a sympathetic view towards RPL may – it is possible – engage in transformative 
decisions. The point is that these policy provisions (the ceiling and exception) in this regard only 
serve to complicate and delay RPL’s paradigmatic and radical aims. The reason may be that of 
wanting to keep longer some systemic integration of ideas.   
The latter somewhat buttresses the argument that there are unwritten cultural precepts 
which are inherently held about the power RPL may be made to have in the epistemological 
legitimation of its radical ‘intrusion’ into the historically predominating structured and formal 
forms of education, the institutional mode of thought and belief which has long been grounded 
on its autonomy and academic freedom. For example, Shalem and Steinberg (2006) talk about 
the need to demonstrate logic of practice and value specific elements during the RPL practice.  
This demonstration is skewed towards the understanding of the institution. In this process, 
power relations between the actors and institution and the applicant are manifest in the former 
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having the final word on whether the latter passes or fails at that point of RPL assessment (De 
Graaff, 2014).  
 
The need to refresh prior learning (?)  
Over and above being aligned to CHE RPL policy, but not with the SAQA’s RPL policy, this 
prevention or ceiling is based on the insufficient proposition that the student may have to refresh 
his or her prior knowledge with new, cutting-edge content, theories, and concepts in the chosen 
field (CHE, 2016). While the prohibitions look prima facie fair, the recent SAQA impact study 
says that this kind of rule is applied by CHE ‘no matter how up-to-date and rigorous such 
learning [by an applicant] might have been’ (SAQA, 2018: 95). This confirms the kind of cultural 
capital and grip institutions have in determining the final narrative on RPL.  
Offering advice, SAQA believes CHE should avoid creating an impression that it is diluting 
the underlying principles and purposes for which it was created (ibid.). The CHE should ‘engage 
with whether it adheres to the belief that traditional forms of knowledge attainment holds equal 
or greater esteem and value when compared to knowledge forms from non-formal, informal and 
non-academic channels, including technical, vocational, occupational and professional’ (SAQA, 
2018: 95). It can be argued that in this connection, the ceiling is ideational, even ideological, in 
that the CHE (wrongly) holds a firm belief that the university is best capable of teaching cutting-
edge knowledge alone. Ultimately, this proposition is found wanting in relation to articulation 
principles of equity, fairness of procedures related to assessment and validation of learning 
(DHET, 2016).  
 
The ten percent rule  
Another important difficulty pertains to the admission rule in relation to RPL applicants. CHE 
(2016) says that only ten percent of the total admissions through RPL is permissible. It makes 
an exception, again, that provided there are motivations for an excess number. This is too 
restrictive and does not act in the spirit of increasing access for a specific group of people; it is 
thus discriminatory and appears to undermine the constitutional imperative according to which 
there is a right to education and equal opportunity (SAQA, 2018). This, like many others in the 
preceding sections above, demonstrates the power of the university structured knowledge and 
its thinking about informal knowledge acquired from outside. This requires attention by CHE.  
 
Conclusion  
The paper acknowledged the contested nature of knowledge and how the politics thereof 
transport itself into the policy-making processes of the sector policy, and how these in turn play 
out at the institutional contextual level of practice by social actors in unpredictable ways. 
Archer’s constructs of structure, culture, and agency demonstrate in the foregoing critique that 
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the CHE policy provisions under analysis are skewed towards preserving the university as the 
only powerful producer and distributor of knowledge – hence it is doing the accommodating. 
Through linguistic techniques the sector creates enablements whilst putting predetermined 
policy provisions which somewhat seem not to rely on a valid and strong academically 
defensible argument but on protecting vested interests.  
Whatever the case may be, the CHE’s suggestion that articulation depends on the nature, 
form, content, or complexity of the qualification is violated by the view of not awarding 
qualifications only on the basis of RPL, and only recognising no more than fifty percent except 
under certain undefined circumstances. In this connection, it has been shown that there is a 
convergence of material and ideational interests where funding and certification requirements 
(structure) coincide with the idea of retaining university hegemony over unstructured forms of 
learning (culture). The provision on the ten percent ceiling (structural and cultural property) has 
been shown to obstruct applicants in a fundamentally unfair, even unconstitutional, way. But 
that obstruction demonstrates the convergence of structural interests and cultural defense of the 
university which may be seeking to insulate the latter from dilution by RPL in a long run. Given 
the critique, it is vital to revisit the CHE RPL policy provisions and clarify, justify, or revise them 
to enable further leeway for the equalisation of structured and unstructured knowledges at the 
level of ideas and beliefs about knowledge.  
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